

EXHIBIT NO. 54

FEBRUARY 19, 1941.

NOTES ON GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING, 10:00 A. M., FEBRUARY 19, 1941

Present:

General G. C. Marshall, Chief of Staff
 Maj. Gen. Wm. Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff
 Maj. Gen. R. C. Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff
 Chief of Infantry, General Lynch
 Chief of Cavalry, General Herr
 Chief of Field Artillery, General Danford
 Chief of Coast Artillery, General Green
 Chief of Air Corps, General Brett
 Chief of Engineer, General Kingman
 Chief Signal Officer, General Mauborgne
 The Adjutant General, General Adms
 The Inspector General, General Peterson
 The Judge Advocate General, General Gullion
 The Surgeon General, General Magee
 The Chief of Finance, General Loughry
 Chief of Ordnance, General Wesson
 The Quartermaster General, General Gregory
 Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, Gen. Baker
 Chief of Chaplains, Colonel Arnold
 Reserve Affairs, General Hester
 Exec. for Under Sec. of War, Gen. Burns
 GHQ—(Col. Hyssong represented Gen. McNair)
 Chief of National Guard Bureau, Gen. Williams
 A. C. of S., G-1, Gen. Shedd
 A. C. of S., G-2, Col. Smith (Act'g)
 A. C. of S., G-3, Col. Twaddle (Act'g)
 A. C. of S., G-4, Col. Meyer (Act'g)
 A. C. of S., WPD, Col. Anderson (Act'g)
 Colonel Orlando Ward, Secretary, General Staff.
 Subject: Defense Objectives (Revised Feb. 13, 1941)

To give you a further view of the special circumstances, we have been pressed by the Navy to provide more security for the Fleet that has been gathering at Manila. They have added one or two major vessels, old large cruisers, I believe. Some time back they added some modern submarines but there was not an AA gun to defend the Cavite anchorage. Not one. And that put Admiral Hart out there in a very embarrassing, if not careless, position, particularly as the Japanese were coming in with a new plane of remarkable speed, 360 mps and climbing ability and heavy gun armament, 6 guns, two of which are 20 mm. The planes out there are well under 300 (mi. per hour).

We have a very archaic plan in the Philippines at the present moment, and I have described the AA situation to Admiral Hart. Under those conditions we have abstracted 18 guns, gotten them out of organizations (very quietly) in order to get them out to the Philippines. That is no complete defense. It is only a very small fraction but it is something. It has the effect of boosting morale and of preventing the Japanese planes from just being contemptuous in their approach. Just as we got it arranged, the Navy wanted equipment for some battalions to go to Wake, Midway and another island where they have to have AA. They took 16 of the guns and left us with 2. We have no more deliveries until July, so all we can send out are 4 unless we take them away from troops, but that is a dilemma.

Out in Hawaii the Fleet is anchored but they have to be prepared against any surprise attack. I don't say any probable attack but they have to be prepared against a surprise attack from a trick ship or torpedo planes. Our whole Navy power in general is concentrated there; they can't cruise for next six months.

We are pretty well off in AA 3" guns out there; we are not so well off in the .50 caliber.

But when it came to planes, we only had 36, of which 19 could cruise 292 miles an hour, with only four guns, two .50's and two .30's. With the new Japanese

plane you can see the situation there. So we arranged to send 31 more P36's to reinforce the 16. (Supposed to have 180.) The carrier is to come back on March 15 and then for the first time we give them the most modern plane—the P-40D, with six guns, two of which are .50 caliber speed 360 miles, leak-proof tanks and armor; not as rapid to climb as the Japanese plane. 50 of those will go on the 15th on the carrier from San Diego to Honolulu to safeguard the Fleet.

* * * * *

General Mauborgne said that another question has to do with change in priorities; these pursuit people can't work without their detectors and if the situation is such that you need guns for the protection of the Navy somewhere in Hawaii, that you are going to have change priorities and get some aircraft warning units mobilized.

Gen. Marshall said we are on that right now.

Gen. Moore said that we are making a complete study of that whole question on aircraft warning and also with reference to priorities and where we are going to establish this service first. The question came up in connection with the Alaskan aircraft warning service.

Gen. Marshall said that with reference to priorities, he had put the cards on the table with Admiral Stark and said, where do you want it. The protection of the Fleet is of major consideration. He said that Admiral Stark was quite embarrassed. When the next planes come out over and above the .50 mm. planes, it is a question of where they go, to Panama or the Philippine Islands. That will be up to the Navy. "I am going to allow them to practically dictate where those planes should go until we reach a certain degree of security." We haven't any modern medium bombers. They are just beginning to come off the line. The question is where do they go. That is a Navy decision, for the protection of the Fleet, and at the present time for the protection of our shores. "I don't think they want the first ones in Manila. They will probably say that they want them first in Hawaii. Then how many in Panama. The Navy can almost tell us. Those priorities will all have to be solved in terms of protection of the Navy in the immediate situation.

EXHIBIT NO. 55

CONFERENCE IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF AT 10:00 A. M., TUESDAY,
FEBRUARY 25, 1941

Present: Chief of Staff, General Egan, General Arnold, General Hatt, General Spang, General Geow, Colonel McNarney, Colonel Anderson, Colonel Twaddle.

CHIEF OF STAFF: In view of the Japanese situation the Navy is concerned with the security of the fleet in Hawaii, and apparently the new commander of the fleet there has made a check and reported it to Washington and the Secretary of the Navy has outlined the situation to the Secretary of War. Their particular point is the type of air force in Hawaii, particularly Pursuit. They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability, but they must guard against everything. We also have information regarding the possible use of torpedo planes. There is the possible sudden introduction of Japanese carrier based planes of the Messerschmitt type which has a speed of 322 miles per hour, armored, etc. The Navy viewpoint is that the whole fleet is involved and that the sea power of the United States might be jeopardized. We have already arranged to send 31 P-36 ships there. The Curtiss plant has moved up the delivery date of 50 additional planes to March 10th; the Navy is sending a carrier back for these ships. The issue is the priority with regard to new equipment. Admiral Hatt has six new submarines, one old cruiser, and set one AA gun. They have now brought up the question of moving some armament from Corregidor. The planes in the Philippines are of the Swedish type which the Chinese turned down. If we had a single squadron of modern planes in the Philippines, it would at least give the Japanese something to think about. Then we have the question of Panama—no modern planes. I understand that the P-40s have some engine trouble which makes them dangerous flying over water.